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NOT ALL EDITS ARE CREATED EQUAL:
THE EDITED MOVIE INDUSTRY'S IMPACT ON




Kate Winslet's performance in Titanic helped propel the movie
to become the highest grossing film of all time.1 One of her scenes in
particular also begat an industry, and now a copyright controversy,
when a small video store in Utah started snipping her nude scene out
of customers' videocassettes of the movie. Since then, the number of
businesses offering edited VHS and DVD movies has increased
dramatically. For at least as long as these new businesses have been
editing movies, the directors of such movies have condemned the
practice as violative of their moral rights to maintain the artistic
integrity of their movies. Additionally, the practices of the edited
movie industry also implicate potential copyright law violations, 2
specifically regarding potential infringement of the movie studios'
exclusive right to prepare derivative works.
The current CleanFlicks litigation in the Federal District Court of
Colorado and the recently signed Family Movie Act look to offer
definitive answers to the immediate questions of whether the current
editing practices infringe the Studios' and Directors' moral rights or
copyright protections. Those answers, though, will implicate more
than the future viability of the edited movie industry. They also
promise to add another chapter to American copyright law regarding
the legitimacy of moral rights claims for works not specifically
t Associate, Payne & Fears, LLP, Irvine, California. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2005.
B.A., Brigham Young University, 2002. 1 would like to thank David Vincent, Matt Astle, and
Professor William W. Fisher, Ill, for their direction and encouragement at various stages of the
writing process. The patient support of my wife, Michelle, also deserves particular mentioning.
1. Titanic grossed over $600 million domestically and over $1.8 billion worldwide. See
Box Office Mojo, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
2. The trademark specific issues alleged by the Directors and Studios, to the extent that
they do not implicate alleged moral rights violations, are beyond the scope of this paper.
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protected by statute, as well as the expansion or limitation of a
copyright holder's control over the preparation of derivative works of
her product.
This paper gauges the impact of the CleanFlicks case and the
Family Movie Act on both sets of questions. Part II briefly examines
the background of American copyright law involving the doctrine of
moral rights and the right to prepare derivative works. Part III details
the rise of the edited movie industry, the current technologies of
digital editing and player control filtering, and the litigation both have
provoked. Part IV then evaluates the moral rights and derivative
works infringement claims raised in the CleanFlicks litigation,
concluding that the Directors' and Studios' moral rights based
Lanham Act Claims will likely fail, as well as the Studios' allegations
of copyright infringement by the Player Control Parties. The
copyright claims raised against the Digital Editors, however,
ultimately require a fair use evaluation, which slightly favors the
Digital Editors. These conclusions are then considered in light of the
potential impact of the Family Movie Act, which grants superfluous
protection to the Player Control Parties and potentially negatively
impacts the Digital Editors' fair use claim. Finally, Part V evaluates
the impact of the likely resolution of the CleanFlicks case on
American copyright law and argues that the case portends the
extinguishment of moral rights claims outside explicit statutory
protection.
With regards to a copyright holder's right to prepare derivative
works, the case should reinforce the bar against a first sale defense of
derivative works infringement claims, but otherwise lead to greater
restrictions. While the full extent of those restrictions rest upon the
success or failure of the Digital Editors' fair use claim, the current
litigation and legislation at a minimum will restrict the definition of
infringing derivative works to those that 1) possess some level of
originality, and 2) have fixed the incorporated underlying work.
II. BACKGROUND LAW ON MORAL RIGHTS AND DERIVATIVE WORKS
A. Moral Rights
The doctrine of "moral rights," or droit moral, concerns a
copyright holder's rights of attribution, as well as the right to protect
the integrity of her works, or copies of her works, once they are no
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longer in her control. 3 It originated in France, where an artist's work
was said to embody an expression of the artist's soul. 4 Thus any
distortion or alteration of that work, even after the work was no
longer in the artist's possession, required the permission of the artist.5
To that end, the moral rights doctrine protects "the personal and
reputational, rather than purely monetary, value of a work to its
creator." 6
The United States has been slow to embrace the concept of
moral rights, partly due to the fact that American copyright law is
primarily driven by economic theories. 7 Hence, courts looking to
enforce moral rights have sometimes looked outside copyright law.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Co. is perhaps the most prominent example of such, when the court
looked to trademark law, specifically Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, to resolve an issue that the court itself said implicated copyright
holders' moral rights.8
At issue in Gilliam, was the American Broadcasting Company's
(ABC) October 1975 broadcast of a ninety-minute special, which
comprised three thirty-minute episodes of the BBC comedy series
"Monty Python's Flying Circus." ABC heavily edited the original
content, cutting out a total of 24 minutes from the original 90 minutes
of programming. 9 The purpose of the editing was apparently both to
make time for commercials, and to remove offensive or obscene
content. 10  After viewing a tape of the special, the plaintiffs,
consisting of Monty Python writers and performers, were appalled at
the broadcast's discontinuity and "mutilation" of the original
programs. They quickly thereafter filed suit to enjoin the broadcast of
a second special that ABC was to air one month later.
3. See Martin Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 554-55 (1940).
4. See Matthew J. McDonough, Note, Moral Rights and the Movies: The Threat and
Challenge of the Digital Domain, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 464 (1997).
5. Id. at 456.
6. Betsy Rosenblatt, Moral Rights Basics, available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property/library/moralprimer.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
7. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that moral
rights are not recognized in American copyright law because the law "seeks to vindicate the
economic, rather than the personal, rights of the authors").
8. Id.
9. Id. at 18.
10. Id.
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On review from the district court, the Second Circuit issued a
preliminary injunction against ABC.11 In reaching its decision, the
court found that a second edited broadcast would likely result in
irreparable harm to Monty Python's professional reputation, 12 and
that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits because the
amount of editing in the first special, 27% of the original, probably
violated ABC's licensing agreement with Time Warner. 13
However, the court also elaborated on a second theory, one with
"roots in the continental concept of droit moral, or moral right," 14
under which the plaintiffs would likely prevail: ABC's edited
broadcast of the Monty Python programs was likely "an actionable
mutilation" of the copyrighted works and thus violated the Lanham
Act, § 43(a). 15 While invoking the notion of moral rights, the Court
recognized that "American copyright law, as presently written, does
not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their
violation." 16 It nevertheless proceeded with its analysis because:
the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that
serves as the foundation for American copyright law ... cannot be
reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation
or misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the artists
are financially dependent. 17
The Lanham Act § 43(a) embodies federal unfair competition
law and is aimed at preventing and redressing "misrepresentations
that may injure plaintiff's business or personal reputation, even where
no trademark is concerned."' 18 According to the court, the broadcast
11. Id. at 19.
12. Id.
13. Id. at21-23.
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 23-24. This section of the Lanham Act is now codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2005).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id. The statute provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
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"at times omitted the climax of the skits to which appellant's rare
brand of humor was leading and at other times deleted essential
elements in the schematic development of the story line." 19  Such
edits constituted a valid cause of action under §43(a) because they
"impaired the integrity of appellant's work and represented to the
public as the product of the appellants, what was actually a mere
caricature of their talents."'20 Thus, the Gilliam court could carefully
invoke Monty Python's moral rights because its holding relied on a
theory "outside the statutory law of copyright. '21
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Gilliam court's approach has been
embraced more by academics than by the courts, as courts have been
reluctant to adopt Gilliam's back-door approach to moral rights.22
Still, the murmur of moral rights rhetoric in the enforcement of some
non-moral rights based statutes has become audible enough that Judge
Posner observed that the doctrine "is creeping into American
copyright law."'23 One example of this may be courts' interpretations
of the first sale doctrine, a doctrine within the realm of copyright law.
The statute allows owners of copies of copyrighted works to, "without
the authority of the copyright owner ... sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy .... ",24 While the language otherwise
appears to limit moral rights protection, courts have construed the
statute to not apply when asserted to justify the sale of an
unauthorized derivative work.25 This means that copyright holders
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2005).
19. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 24.
22. See, e.g., Halicki v. United Artists Comm'ns, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987)
(declining to read the Lanham Act as expansively as Gilliam where theaters advertised a PG-
rated movie as R-rated); Choe v. Fordham Univ. Law Sch., 920 F.Supp. 44, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding that a journal's editing of plaintiffs article failed to meet the substantial distortion
standard required by Gilliam); Paramount Pictures Corp., v. Video Broad. Corp., 724 F. Supp.
808 (D. Kan. 1989) (finding that a local video store's replacement of commercials at the
beginning of plaintiffs videocassettes implicated no Lanham Act moral rights); Lee v. A.R.T.
Co., 125 F.3d 580 at 582 (unwilling to use the derivative works right as "back door [for] an
extraordinarily broad version of authors' moral rights").
23. Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, 132 F.3d 1167, 1173 (7th Cir. 1997).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
25. See, e.g., Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the first sale doctrine does not impair the copyright holder's exclusive
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still retain some modicum of control over copies of their works (or at
least derivatives of their works) once they enter the marketplace.
Even so, Congress has until recently been hesitant to formally
recognize moral rights protection. This was perhaps best evidenced
by the United States' reluctance to join the Berne Convention until
1989.26 The Berne Convention, first established in 1886, is a
multilateral agreement administered by the World Intellectual
Property Organization requiring all governments party to the
agreement to provide minimum protections to its copyright holders.
The required protections include a copyright holder's moral rights:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 27
When Congress eventually authorized entry into the Beme
Convention, it did so without providing for any additional form of
moral rights despite the Convention's requirements. Instead, it
reasoned that the existing "patchwork of federal and state statutes and
common law" was already sufficient to satisfy the requirements. 28
A year later, however, Congress granted limited moral rights
protection with the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA).29 Among the rights granted by the Act are the right of the
author of a "work of visual art" to claim authorship,30 and to prevent
the use of the author's name "in the event of a distortion, mutilation,
or other modification" of her work that would prejudice or dishonor
the author's reputation.31 The Act then goes further to allow authors
of "work[s] of visual art" the right:
To prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her
right to prepare derivative works); Precious Moments, Inc. v. La Infantil, Inc., 971 F.Supp. 66,
67-68 (D.P.C. 1997) (holding that the first sale doctrine does not limit other exclusive rights
enumerated in the copyright statute, including the right to prepare derivative works).
26. The United States officially joined the Berne Convention with the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988.
27. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Property, July 24,
1971, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986).
28. MICHAEL A. EPsTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 4-63, 4-64 (3d ed.
Supp. 1998).
29. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(A) (2000).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(a)(l)(A) (2000).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(a)(2) (2000).
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honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification of that work is a violation of that right .... 32
This right may be waived by the author, but it cannot be
transferred.33
On the surface, the rights granted under VARA appear to be
broad and expansive, but significantly less so when one notes how
narrowly it defines "work of visual art." Congress restricted the
definition of "works of visual art" to paintings, drawings, prints,
photos, or sculptures "existing in a single copy" or otherwise limited
to 200 copies or less. 34
Perhaps even more interesting than the works Congress chose to
protect under VARA are the works it chose not to protect, most
notably movies. Movies, in fact, appear to be doubly restricted from
the statute's protection because, in addition to being excluded from
the definition of "work of visual art," the statute expressly states that
a work of visual art does not include a work made for hire.35 Since
most film directors are employed by a movie studio, the work for hire
exemption covers the product of their labors. The precise reason for
exclusion of movies from statutory protection is unclear, though it
may rest with the notion that the movie industry is almost as much a
consumer oriented business as it is an art form. It may also involve
the fact that most of the artists creating movies do not hold the
copyrights in their works.
B. Derivative Works
The doctrinal underpinnings of American copyright law lay in
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress
the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '36
To that end, the Copyright Act of 1976 grants copyright holders
broad protections for their copyrighted works.37 Among those
protections, § 106(2) gives the copyright holder an exclusive right "to
32. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(a)(3)(A) (2000).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(d) (2000).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work" or to
authorize such. 38 The Act defines a "derivative work" as:
[a] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which,
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
"derivative work. ''39
Because courts have interpreted the right to reproduction so
expansively,40 surprisingly few cases have interpreted § 106(2). Of
those that have, most have centered on resolving the statute's
vagueness regarding: (1) whether infringement requires that a
derivative work be fixed in a tangible medium of expression; and (2)
how much originality in the new work is required to trigger the
statute.
1. Fixation
Any potential fixation requirement, it would seem, should be
easily resolved by the legislative history of § 106(2), which addresses
it directly. It explains:
[The exclusive right to prepare derivative works] is broader than
[the exclusive right to reproduction] ... in the sense that
reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas
the preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime,
or improvised performance, may be infringement even though
nothing is ever fixed in tangible form. 4 1
That explanation, however, has proven to be far from conclusive,
mostly because of the absurdity that would result if the explanation
were to be applied literally.42
38. Id.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 62 (1976) (noting that the right
to prepare derivative works overlaps the right of reproduction to some extent).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
42. One scholar noted that reading the language of the statute literally would make simply
imagining some modified version of a copyrighted work an illegal act. See Tyler T. Ochoa,
Symposium Review: Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, Or Does
the Form(gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 991 (2004).
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The Ninth Circuit considered fixation in Galoob v. Nintendo of
America,43 and actually seemed to assume without discussion that the
opposite was true. After an explanation of the facts and the underlying
statute, the court stated flatly: "A derivative work must incorporate a
protected work in some concrete or permanent 'form.' 44 At issue in
Galoob was the Game Genie, a product designed to alter some of the
features of video games played on the original Nintendo.45 By
entering codes provided in an accompanying manual, players could
block and replace the values of certain data bytes sent from the video
game to the Nintendo. 46 Importantly, the Game Genie's effects were
temporary and made no alterations to the data stored in the game
cartridge. 47 Nintendo argued that the audiovisual displays created by
the Game Genie violated Nintendo's exclusive right to prepare
derivative works. 48
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the Game Genie was
not a derivative work because "[t]he Game Genie merely enhances
the audiovisual displays (or the underlying data bytes) that originate
in the Nintendo game cartridges. The altered displays do not
incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some concrete or
permanent form."49 The court further pointed to the fact that the
Game Genie was useless by itself, as it still required the original
video game cartridge to function. 50 This meant that the Game Genie
would not supplant consumer demand for original cartridges, and the
court concluded that "[s]uch innovations rarely will constitute
infringing derivative works under the Copyright Act." 51
The Ninth Circuit revisited the fixation requirement in Micro
Star v. Formgen, Inc.52 Formgen Inc. owned the rights to Duke
43. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (1992).
44. Id. at 967. Judge Kozinski recognized as much when the Ninth Circuit revisited the
issue years later, stating, "[t]he requirement that a derivative work must assume a concrete or
permanent form was recognized without much discussion in Galoob." Micro Star v. Formgen,
Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, Galoob and Micro Star apparently try
to differentiate "fixation" from "assuming a concrete or permanent form" but the ideas appear to
be fundamentally the same. See Ochoa, supra note 42 at 1004.
45. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967.
46. Id. The court explains: "If that value controls the character's strength, for example,
then the character can be made invincible by increasing the value sufficiently." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 968 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 969.
51. Id.
52. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1107.
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Nukem 3D, a popular computer game. The retail version of the gamed
bundled with it a "Build Editor" that allowed players to create their
own game levels. 53 Micro Star, in turn, compiled 300 player-created
levels on a CD and then sold it commercially as "Nuke It."' 54 The
issue in Micro Star was whether the Nuke It CD, consisting solely of
MAP files that had to be used in conjunction with the original game,
violated Formgen's exclusive right to prepare derivative works. Micro
Star argued that Nuke It was not a derivative work because, similar to
Galoob, the audiovisual displays generated by running Duke Nukem
3D with Nuke It's MAP files were not incorporated in a concrete or
permanent form, and that the MAP files "do not copy any of Duke
Nukem 3D's protected expression. ' 55 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.
In finding that Nuke It was an infringing derivative work, the
court first clarified Galoob's fixation requirement with a "low-tech
example":
Imagine a product called the Pink Screener, which consists of a big
piece of pink cellophane stretched over a frame. When put in front
of a television, it makes everything on the screen look pinker.
Someone who manages to record the programs with this pink cast
(maybe by filming the screen) would have created an infringing
derivative work. But the audiovisual display observed by a person
watching television through the Pink Screener is not a derivative
work because it does not incorporate the modified image in any
permanent or concrete form. The Game Genie might be described
as a fancy Pink Screener for video games, changing the value of
the game as perceived by the current player, but never
incorporating the new audiovisual display into a permanent or
concrete form.56
The court then distinguished the MAP files in Nuke It from
Galoob's Game Genie by pointing to the fact that "whereas the
audiovisual displays created by the Game Genie were never recorded
in any permanent form, the audiovisual displays generated by Duke
Nukem 3D from the Nuke It MAP files are in the MAP files
themselves. ' 57 The court later explained that MAP files did not
contain the actual audiovisual displays, but rather "exact, down to the
53. Id. at 1109.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1111.
56. Id. at 1111 n.4 (emphasis added). Judge Kozinski's example also reveals just how
minimally the Ninth Circuit construes the originality requirement of §106(2), which will be
discussed below.
57. Id.
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last detail, descriptions of [the] audiovisual display[s]," which were
sufficient to meet the "permanent or concrete form" requirement in
Galoob.58
The Ninth Circuit thus far appears to be the only appellate court
to have addressed fixation. Each time, it has required that for every
derivative work, the incorporated portion of the underlying
copyrighted work must be embodied in some concrete or permanent
form.
2. Originality
As noted above, the statutory definition of a derivative work
captures those "form[s] in which a work may be recast, transformed,
or adapted" as well as works "consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship ... -59 That an artist must
make some "more than merely trivial" original contribution to a work
in order for it to be a derivative is apparently well settled.60 The
various circuits have, however, interpreted the originality requirement
differently.
The Ninth Circuit apparently requires a very low threshold of
originality. In Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., the
defendant purchased books of artwork, in which plaintiffs held the
copyrights for. 61 The defendant then carefully removed the pictures
from the book, mounted them on ceramic tile, and resold them. The
court found that this process amounted to preparation of a derivative
work, relying on the statutory definition's disjunctive clause "or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted. '62
Nine years later the Seventh Circuit considered essentially the
same case and held the opposite. In Lee v. A.R.T. Co.,63 the A.R.T.
company bought the plaintiffs artwork, either lithographed or on note
cards, and then similarly mounted the work on ceramic tiles.64
Despite plaintiffs reliance on Mirage, the court held that the process
did not recast or adapt the copyrighted artwork, nor did it transform it
"in the slightest," because "[i]t still depicts exactly what it depicted
58. ld.at1111-12.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
60. Eric C. Surette, What Constitutes a Derivative Work Under the Copyright Act of 1976,
149 A.L.R. 527, §3 (1998).
61. Mirage, 856 F.2dat 1342.
62. Id. at 1343.
63. Lee, 125 F.3d at 580.
64. Id.
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when it left Lee's studio."' 65 The court, seemingly speaking both to
the plaintiff and the Ninth Circuit, noted that if mounting a work met
§ 106(2)'s "transformation" requirement, "then any alteration of a
work, however slight, requires the author's permission. '66 The court
continued:
We asked at oral argument what would happen if a person jotted a
note on one of the note cards, or used it as a coaster for a drink, or
cut it in half, or if a collector applied his seal (as is common in
Japan); Lee's counsel replied that such changes prepare derivative
works, but that as a practical matter the artists would not file suit.
A definition of derivative work that makes criminals out of art
collectors and tourists is jarring despite Lee's gracious offer not to
commence civil litigation.67
The problem seems to be that, as with the fixation requirement,
too strict an interpretation of the statutory definition leads to
untenable results.
With the current conflicts surrounding the edited movie industry,
both Congress and the courts have an opportunity to revisit the
derivative works doctrine and provide further guidance on properly
identifying a derivative work under § 106(2). Specifically, in
evaluating industry practices, both branches have an opportunity to
expand, refine, reinforce, or even reject: (1) the fixation requirement
some courts have read into the statute; (2) the various interpretations
of the originality requirement; and (3) the reasons justifying fair use.
These decisions also implicate changes to the moral rights doctrine in
the United States, since a broad definition of a derivative work
inherently expands copyright holders' moral rights, just as a more
narrow definition would restrict them. Together with a reevaluation of
Gilliam's approach to moral rights, the legal landscape is poised to
either further the "creep" of moral rights into American copyright
law, or barricade off any further intrusion.
III. THE EDITED MOVIE INDUSTRY
A. Background
The edited movie industry has its origins in Northern Utah,
where the population is predominantly of the Mormon faith.
65. Id. at 582.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Mormons are generally expected to maintain high moral standards
regarding their entertainment choices. 68 As such, their standards have
increasingly required avoiding most of Hollywood's entertainment
offerings-particularly with regard to movies. For years this meant
that many Mormons would only see otherwise objectionable movies
when they happened to catch them edited on an airline flight, on
television, or at Brigham Young University's Varsity Theater. 69
In 1998, however, the immense popularity of the Academy-
Award winning movie Titanic, led two Utah businesses to devise
more creative ways for their Mormon customers to keep up with
popular, if sometimes objectionable, movies while still comporting to
Mormon beliefs. 70 One theater in American Fork, Utah decided to
show an edited version of Titanic that removed Kate Winslet's nude
scene, as well as a scene where Winslet's and Leonardo DiCaprio's
characters apparently have sex. 71 Once the film was released on
videocassette, the owners of Sunrise Family Video in Pleasant Grove,
UT offered to snip those same scenes from customers' copies of the
movie for a small fee. 72 Paramount Pictures acted quickly to stop both
practices, but could only prevail upon the movie theater by pulling the
movie and forcing its executives to sign an agreement that they would
no longer display edited movies.73 The video store, on the other hand,
dismissed Paramount's letter requesting that they discontinue the
practice, reasoning that if patrons owned the movie, they had the right
68. See, e.g., THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, FOR THE STRENGTH
OF YOUTH: FULFILLING OUR DUTY To GOD 17 (2001). The relevant portion of the booklet
advises youth "Do not attend, view, or participate in entertainment that is vulgar, immoral,
violent, or pornographic in any way. Do not participate in entertainment that in any way presents
immorality or violent behavior as acceptable."
69. See Tad Walch, Varsity Making Comeback With Clean Flicks, DESERET NEWS, Feb.
23, 2005, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,600114050,00.html; See also
Rebecca Buckman, A Cottage Industry in Utah Cleans Up Hollywood's Act: Video Stores,
Software Firms Cater to Mormon Tastes, THE WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2002, at Al. Since the
1960's the Varsity Theater offered edited versions of popular R-rated movies. It caught movie
studios' attention when Steven Spielberg refused to allow screenings of an edited version of
Schindler's List. It stopped showing edited movies entirely in 1998. Id.
70. Mark Eddington, Popular Videos Get 'Titanic Makeover', SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 30,
2000, at B 1; See also Jeffrey P. Haney, Cut Titanic' Popular, but is it Legal?, DESERET NEWS,
July 24, 1998, at Al.
71. See Haney, supra note 70, at Al.
72. Andy Seiler, Near, Far, Wherever You Are, Utah Store Snips Titanic' Nudity, USA
TODAY, Sept. 3, 1998, at D3. Sunrise Family Video charged five dollars to remove the above
mentioned scenes, and three dollars for anything else the customers wanted removed. Id.
73. Jeff Call, American Fork Video Store May Be Winning Battle With Studio Over Edited
Films, DESERET NEWS, July 30, 1999, at L2.
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to do whatever they wanted with it.74 Paramount never pursued the
matter further.
The appetite for edited movies quickly grew beyond Titanic, and
so too did the number of companies offering to edit customers'
videocassettes. In fact, with technological advancements, including
the proliferation of DVDs, the original method of splicing videotape
has given way to less cumbersome, more efficient alternatives. 75 At
present, the edited movie industry divides along two technological
lines: digital editing and player controlled filtering.
1. Digital Editors: CleanFlicks et al.
Companies offering digital editing,76 while keeping some aspects
of the process secret, 77 generally use similar methods to edit movies.
The movie editor purchases a copy of a movie, transfers it to the hard
drive of a computer and creates an edited master copy of the
original. 78 Then, when customers send in their original video copy of
a movie, 79 the editor records his edited master copy of the movie over
the original.80 If the customer has requested an edited DVD, the editor
records the edited master copy onto a DVDRW. 81 Several of these
74. See Katharine Biele, Videos: Who Makes the Final Cut?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Oct. 5, 1998, at 1.
75. See Sharon Weinberg Nokes, E-Rated Movies: Coming Soon to a Home Theater Near
You?, 92 GEORGETOWN L.J. 611, 618 (2004) (noting that the time required to splice
videocassettes "made editing large quantities of video tapes financially impracticable").
76. Both the Studios' and Directors' counterclaims in the CleanFlicks case list ten
separate digital editors against whom they allege infringement. See, e.g., Motion Picture Studio
Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims at 5, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D.
Colo. Dec. 13, 2002). Currently at least seven separate companies offer edited DVDs and
videocassettes. See, e.g. CleanFilms.com, http://www.cleanfilms.com (last visited Oct. 17,
2005).
77. See Kieth Merrill, Cleaning Up the Movies, Part 1, at 5, MERIDIAN MAGAZINE,
available at http://www.meridianmagazine.com/arts/020604clean.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2005) (noting that none of the editing companies interviewed were willing to discuss how they
digitize the DVD).
78. See Id. ("Before you or I ever order our cleaned up version of The Patriot, the
company has already purchased it in DVD, dumped it into a computer, and dropped the graphic
violence.").
79. Recently some digital editing companies have stopped requiring that customers send
in their original copies of movies, instead only requiring them to indicate that they do in fact
already own the movie. See, e.g., https://www.cleanflicks.com/buynow.php?movielD=822 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2005).
80. Id., See also Mark Eddington, Director's Cut? Try Censor's Cut, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Apr. 14, 2002, El. (quoting an owner of several edited video stores that "we record
the edited version over the original copy").
81. Merrill, supra note 77. Companies like CleanFlicks and CleanFilms additionally
disable the original copy of the DVD but include it with the edited copy as "proof of purchase."
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companies, including CleanFlicks, even offer rental co-ops, whereby
members pay a fee and are ostensibly given partial ownership in each
movie the company owns. They can then rent out the edited movies of
their choosing.8 2 At all times the companies are careful to maintain a
one to one ratio between purchased original versions of a movie and
edited copies.83
The standards governing the content of the edits are roughly the
same among the various editing businesses. For example, CleanFilms
promises:
We take out all profanity and other offensive language, including
vain or disrespectful references to Deity. We also remove nudity,
sexual situations, and extreme or gory violence. Our intent is to
edit movies so that they would qualify for a PG rating, which
usually means we will edit out content that the broadcast networks
and airlines might leave in when they show the same movie. 84
The edits are generally accomplished either by dropping the
volume for profanity or cutting the objectionable portions of the
scene. 85 For some scenes, CleanFlicks, rather than cut a scene
entirely, blurs some of the images on the screen.86 Most companies
admit that some movies are "uneditable," either because they would
require too many edits or because their overall theme is
objectionable.8 7
See, e.g., CleanFilms.com, http://www.cleanfilms.com/viewmessage.phtml?help&id=51 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2005).
82. CleanFlicks at present boasts over 700 different edited titles available for purchase or
rental. http://www.cleanflicks.com/previewTitles.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
83. See, e.g., CleanFilms, Is it Legal to Edit Movies,
http://www.cleanfilms.com/about-edited.phtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2005). ("CleanFilms
collectively purchases original, unedited DVD movies then has them edited - always
maintaining a I to I ratio of edited and non-edited originals.").
84. CleanFilms, http://www.cleanfilms.com/viewmessage.phtml?help&id=9 (last visited
Oct. 4, 2005).
85. See, e.g., CleanFilms, How are the movies edited?,
http://www.cleanfilms.com/about-edited.phtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2005). The website further
claims that "the cut edit is not noticeable, similar to viewing PG-13 or R rated movies that have
been edited for TV." Id. While this is generally true, the edits are often slightly noticeable.
86. See Michael Janofsky, Utah Shop Offers Popular Videos With the Sex and Violence
Excised, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A11. (noting that Ray Lines, founder of CleanFlicks and
CEO blurred images of naked men in concentration camps in Schindler's List because "he felt
their appearance overstated their dehumanization").
87. See, e.g., The Edited Artist FAQ, http://www.editartist.com/FAQPage.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2005). The Player Control Parties also refuse to create filters for some movies for the
same reasons.
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2. Player Control Filtering
The second form of editing technology, player control filtering,
edits movies without ever creating a permanent edited copy.
ClearPlay, a Salt Lake City based company, is the most prominent
developer and vendor of this form of editing. With ClearPlay and
similar software, the original DVD remains intact and unaltered.
Instead, a DVD is loaded onto a computer or customized DVD player
with the ClearPlay or like software. A "filter" for the particular movie
is either installed or can be downloaded from ClearPlay's website. 88
The customer then chooses from a number of categories the desired
level of content editing,89 and while the movie is playing, the
software mutes or skips the objectionable portions of the movie as
determined by the customer's preference level. Patrons may purchase
and download filters for movies on an individual basis, or pay a
monthly subscription fee and have access to all available filters.90
According to ClearPlay, the filter files simply consist of "timing
and instructions" references for the DVD movies and do not
themselves contain or describe any content from the DVD.91
ClearPlay describes the process as follows:
ClearPlay employees review movies that have been released on
DVD and create timing data for offensive segments that occur on
the different DVDs. ClearPlay's employees then assign navigation
instructions to the timing data identifying when to skip or mute
portions of a DVD containing offensive content. If profanity is
heard from 0:12:59:00 to 00:12:59:20 on a DVD, the Filter File
will identify that period of two-thirds of a second to be muted. If a
decapitation and bullets tearing through flesh are shown from
88. The ClearPlay service uses "ClearPlay Filters" that are associated with each different
movie. The ClearPlay filters are compiled by a staff which goes through individual movies to
identify content which may have contributed to a movie's PG-13 or R rating. The content they
identify generally falls under the categories of graphic violence, sexual content, and language.
ClearPlay, http://www.clearplay.com/About.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
89. The ClearPlay website notes: "ClearPlay lets you turn ON or OFF up to 14 Filter
Settings for each movie! You determine the Filter settings for your family." ClearPlay,
http://www.clearplay.com/About.aspx. (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). The 14 different filter
settings fall under four general categories: Violence, Sex and Nudity, Language, and Other. Id.
90. ClearPlay currently boasts over 1,500 movie filters. See ClearPlay,
http://www.clearplay.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
91. See The Player Control Parties' Opening Brief In Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment at 12, Huntsman, No. 02-M- 1662 (D. Colo. May 30, 2003), available at
http://viewerfreedom.info/legal/20030530CP/motion.pdf [hereinafter Player Control Parties'
Motion for Summary Judgment].
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00:48:49:00 to 00:48:58:00 on a DVD, the Filter File will identify
that nine-second segment to be skipped.92
The filtering software therefore functions like a precisely timed
"pre-programmed remote control." 93
An alternative form of the technology, developed by Trilogy
Studios, is MovieMask. The MovieMask software functions much
like ClearPlay, in that it similarly makes no physical changes to the
original DVD. It also requires downloaded "masks," and provides
various menu options for selecting the desired level of editing for a
particular film. 94 MovieMask distinguishes itself, however, by its
ability not only to remove unwanted content from movies, but to
superimpose images and sounds over the original material. 95 For
instance, as opposed to merely deleting Kate Winslet's nude scene in
Titanic, the MovieMask software can instead dress her in a corset,
covering the nudity but leaving the scene intact. 96 The software also
comes with tools allowing customers to create their own masks. 97
Interestingly, though, the MovieMask software quietly went off the
market in September 2004, for what the company has cryptically
termed "licensing issues."'98
B. Huntsman v. Soderbergh: The "CleanFlicks Case"
Not unexpectedly, several Hollywood directors were upset that
companies were making unauthorized edits to their movies. The legal
wrangling between the directors and the edited movie industry began
when representatives from Trilogy studios met with a few prominent
directors to display their MovieMask software's capabilities. 99
92. Id.
93. Id. at 24.
94. See MovieMask, http://moviemask.com/what.php (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
95. See, e.g., The Osgood File, DIY Censorship; New Technology Blips Violence, Sex and
Profanity from DVDs (CBS radio broadcast, June 12, 2002) transcript available at
http://www.acfnewsource.org/art/diy_censorship.html.
96. Dave Wilson, New Software Lets Viewers Choose DVD Film's Rating, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2001, Business Part 3, at 1.
97. How MovieMask Works, http://moviemask.com/products.php (last visited Oct. 13,
2005) (describing the filtering tools).
98. See id. The company spokesman further notes that "Hopefully as time progresses the
doors will be opened, and we will be able to bring this much needed technology to families that
are waiting for this service." Id.
99. See The Early Show: Breck Rice of Trilogy Studios Discusses His Company Software
That Allows Customers to Edit Movies on DVD (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 20, 2002)
(transcript available at LEXIS, CBS News Transcripts); Hollywood Fights Against Sanitized
Videos, NBC Nightly News (Sept. 23, 2002) (transcript available at LEXIS, NBC News
Transcripts).
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Apparently Rob Reiner, among others, "went ballistic" when he saw
one version of his movie "The Princess Bride" where Trilogy had
created a mask replacing the swords in a battle scene with light
sabers. 100
A short time after the meeting, a press release was inadvertently
posted on the Director's Guild of America (DGA) website
condemning the practices of both MovieMask and CleanFlicks and
contemplating a lawsuit. 101 Once Robert Huntsman, a franchisee of
CleanFlicks in Colorado, saw the document, he and another
CleanFlicks franchisee filed a pre-emptive lawsuit in the Colorado
District Court against several Hollywood film directors seeking a
declaratory judgment that their editing practices were legal. 102
Huntsman cited the one to one relationship between purchased
original versions of movies and edited versions, as well as the idea
that the "Clean Flicks methodology" targets a new audience beyond
the original that finds parts of the original works objectionable. 103 The
complaint alleges that these two factors help protect their movie
editing practices under the first sale and fair use doctrines. 104
In response to the lawsuit, the DGA successfully filed to
intervene on behalf of the named and unnamed directors
implicated, 105 and along with the named directors, answered,
counterclaimed, 10 6 and moved to join other third party movie editors,
including ClearPlay and the Player Control Parties. 107
100. Id.
101. A copy of the document may be found at
http://www.viewerfreedom.org/legal/2002082ODGAIDGAfileslawsuit.PDF.
102. See Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 6, Huntsman, No. 02-M-1662
(D. Colo. Oct. 28, 2002).
103. Id. 7. The complaint states: "The Clean Flicks methodology involves targeting a new
audience beyond the audience of the original work. This new audience are individuals who are
not members of the original audience because the work contains material they, the new
audience, find objectionable. Using this methodology, original movies are purchased, and third
party edits are made in which objectionable content is deleted or in some cases altered in some
other way, to effectively remove content deemed objectionable by a particular targeted viewing
audience." Id.
104. Id. 15. The plaintiffs also allege that the First Amendment protects their editing
practices. This defense will not be considered, both because it is outside the scope of this paper
and unlikely to factor into the ultimate decision. See Nokes, supra note 75 at n.219.
105. See Director's Guild of America's Motion For Leave To Intervene, Huntsman, No.
02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2002).
106. See Proposed Amended Counterclaim, Huntsman, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Sept. 20,
2002).
107. See Motion for Leave to Join Third Parties as Counterdefendants, Huntsman, No. 02-
M-1662 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2002). In all, the defendants joined thirteen other third party movie
editors. The DGA and named directors will collectively be referred to as "Directors."
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Since the movie studios, not the directors, hold copyrights in the
movies being edited, the original counterclaim alleged mostly
Lanham Act violations relating to trademark infringement, dilution,
and unfair competition. 108 However, the Directors also moved to join
the movie studios. 109 The Studios, in turn, submitted their own answer
and counterclaim, this time alleging violations of § 101 by the Digital
Editors and Player Control Parties, as well as trademark infringement
and violations of the Lanham Act § 43(a) by the Digital Editors." 1 0 In
May 2003, ClearPlay and the other Player Control Parties filed a
motion for summary judgment,"' and the motion is still awaiting a
ruling.
Perhaps not surprisingly, none of the Defendants' counter-claims
regarding copyright or Lanham Act violations112 explicitly allege
infringement of their moral rights by the edited movie industry. The
Directors' rhetoric regarding the case, however, indicates that moral
rights lay at the heart of their claims.113 In a letter addressing the
implications of the lawsuit, DGA President Martha Coolidge stated:
"All creative works, whether they are films, novels, paintings or
comic books, are the output of their creators, and stand as
representatives of their creator's intentions" and "are what their
creators wanted them to be." 114
The plaintiffs, meanwhile, have framed the litigation as one that
implicates consumers', particularly families', right to privately view
the movies in the way they wish to view them, even when this entails
108. See Proposed Amended Counterclaim, supra note 106.
109. See Motion to Compel Joinder of Third-Party Copyright Holders As Necessary Parties
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) at 2, Huntsman, No. 02-
M-1662 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2002) available at
http://viewerfreedom.org/legal/20020920DGA/Motion to Join Studios.pdf.
110. See Motion Picture Studio Defendants Answer and Counterclaims at 5, Huntsman,
No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2002) available at
http://viewerfreedom.info/legal/20021213Studio/studiofiling.pdf.
111. See Player Control Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra, note 91.
112. Again, although the defendants Section 43(a) Lanham Act false designation of origin
claims are not entirely separable from the trademark infringements alleged, the trademark issues
are likely met by the extensive labeling practices of the plaintiffs and, even if not, are beyond
the scope of this paper.
113. See, e.g., Tom Feran, Commentary: Movie 'Cleaners' Rake in Dirty Money,
NEWSHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 27, 2002 (quoting the DGA's executive director, Jay Roth:
".... this is fundamentally about artistic and creative rights and whether someone has the right to
take an artist's work, change it, and then sell it.").
114. See Letter from the President of the DGA, Martha Coolidge (Sept. 20, 2002),
available at http://www.dga.org/news/v27 3/deptpresreport.php3.
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effectively paying someone to permanently mute or fast forward the
portions they find objectionable. 115
IV. EVALUATING THE CLEANFLICKS CASE
A. Moral Rights and the Lanham Act
Defendants' moral rights claims, masked by Gilliam like
assertions of false designation of origin, are unlikely to prevail, in part
because reliance on Gilliam for such claims has proven tenuous at
best. 116 In the thirty years since Gilliam broke new ground for
enforcement of moral rights, courts have simply been unwilling to
affirm or extend its holding, which means if the court ever embraces
Gilliam, it would be the exception rather than the rule. Perhaps, if
Judge Posner is correct in stating that moral rights are "creeping into
American copyright law," the atmosphere might be right for the
Colorado District Court, and later the Tenth Circuit, to use Gilliam's
approach for false designation of origin claims. In the thirty years
following Gilliam, we've seen American copyright law uphold or
endorse some limited form of moral rights, both through entry into the
Berne Convention and the enactment of the VARA.
However, neither of those Congressional Acts hinted at moral
rights protection of movies. Additionally, courts are unlikely to ignore
the fact that Congress not only failed to mention movies in its
definition of "visual art," but also specifically excluded them from
protection under works made for hire. In the end, the court is unlikely
to ignore both VARA's exclusion and an almost thirty year failure by
the courts to embrace Gilliam's holding. Even if the court embraces
Gilliam, the defendants' still have a difficult time meeting the burden
it imposes on successful claims." 17
The purpose of the Lanham Act § 43(a) is to prevent
misrepresentations, such that the author of an original work is not
"present[ed] to the public as the creator of a work not his own, and
thus [keep him from being] subject to criticism for work he has not
115. See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, The Digital Censor: Utah Firm Locked in Legal Battle
Over Software that Blocks Out Sex and Violence on DVDs, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 20, 2003, at
El (quoting Andrew Bridges, attorney for ClearPlay: "If ClearPlay is illegal, so is the remote
control.").
116. See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1109.
117. The weakness of a § 43(a) false designation of origin claim against the Player Control
Parties, even with a finding that the technology created infringing derivative works, seems
evidenced by the fact that the studios did not even raise such claims.
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done."'18 The studios and directors both allege that the plaintiffs'
industry works just such a misrepresentation. The mutes and cuts (and
additions with MovieMask) are made without authorization, and thus
adulterate the defendants' intended viewing experience with
sometimes disjointed dialogue or plot sequences."l 9 The expurgated
elements also are often critical to establishing the directors' intended
mood of a film, portrayal of a character, or depth of a relationship. As
a result, scenes, characters, and plotlines are at best left
misrepresented, and at worst left with gaping holes. The movies are
therefore mutilated, distorted, and misrepresented from the
defendants' intended versions, and consequently are infringing under
Gilliam's interpretation of § 43(a).
The above-mentioned impact of editing movies might therefore
legitimize defendants' claims, had Gilliam indeed established that
mutilation and distortion of an underlying work constitutes a cause of
action under the Lanham Act § 43(a) that is separable from the
misrepresentation of the underlying work to the public. As much as it
tries to however, the Gilliam court cannot separate the claims and still
remain within the Lanham Act. The truth is that the Gilliam opinion
only gets to invoke language about violation of Monty Python's moral
rights because it found that: (1) ABC had not disclosed to the public
that it had edited the underlying programs; (2) viewers tuning into the
broadcast would miss a disclaimer at the beginning of the program
and not be aware that it was edited; 120 and (3) "the viewer ha[d] no
means of comparing the truncated version with the complete work in
order to determine for himself the talents of the plaintiffs."' 12 1 The
court weakly tries to argue that the claims are separable by asserting
that ABC's special wrought such distortion and mutilation on the
original programs that no disclaimer could prevent it from being a
118. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
119. See, e.g., Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims 24, 50, 51,
Huntsman, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2002). Also note that the studios allege that these
derivative copies of the movies, both on video cassette and DVD, are often of inferior quality
because of degraded audio and visuals from the copying process, as well as with the absence of
additional features normally available on originals. Id.
120. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25 n.13. The oddity of the court's opinion, perhaps for reasons
related to the technological limitations of the 1970s, is that it seems to assume that Judge
Gerfein's disclaimer suggestion at the beginning of the program was the most extensive labeling
possible. Id. Even though the court is "doubtful that a few words could erase the indelible
impression that is made by a television broadcast," a more extensive display of those words
(e.g., every few minutes of the broadcast) would conceivably mitigate, if not eliminate, the
plaintiff's Lanham Act claims. Id.
121. Id.
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misrepresentation under the Lanham Act § 43(a). 122 The argument,
however, assumes that misrepresentation of the intent, character, or
purpose of the original can amount to misrepresentation to the viewer
that the truncated version is the original under the statute. Such a
finding simply is not supportable. Without the latter form of
misrepresentation, no claim for the former exists under the Lanham
Act § 43(a).
None of the problems distinguishing the altered version from the
original that plagued the ABC broadcast at issue in Gilliam appear to
burden the plaintiffs in this case. With the Digital Editors, for
example, the movies bear extensive markings indicating that they are
edited: on the sleeve, on the DVD (or videocassette), at the beginning
of a movie, and often during the movie itself.123 This says nothing of
the fact that the people viewing edited movies are almost entirely a
self-selecting group, renting or purchasing the edited movies and
filtering technology at a premium because they desire to see the
movie in edited form. The businesses offering the edits also cater
exclusively to this segment of the population by advertising and
representing themselves only as purveyors of an edited movie
experience. Additionally, the original versions of movies are far more
widely available than their edited counterparts, which ensure an
edited movie viewer has ample "means of comparing the [edited]
version with the complete work in order to determine for himself the
talents of the [defendants]."124
But even absent a requirement of misrepresentation, the amount
and substance of plaintiffs' edits likely do not match the level of
mutilation and distortion described in Gilliam. In Gilliam, ABC's
broadcast cut nearly a third of the original programming, "sometimes
omitted the climax of some of the skits," and "at other times deleted
essential elements in the schematic development of a story line."'1 25
For the most part, the edits provided by both the Digital Editors and
Player Control Parties purportedly involve substantially less editing,
often amounting to only a few minutes of a movie's run time. 126 To
122. See id.
123. CleanFlicks and FamilyFlix for example now frequently insert their logo every few
minutes within the film to remind viewers they are watching an edited version.
124. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25, n.13.
125. Id. at 25.
126. See Counterdefendant Player Control Parties' Opening Brief in Support of Their
Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Huntsman, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. 2002) (giving as an
example, "if profanity is heard from 00:12:59:00 to 00:12:59:20 on a DVD, the Filter File will
identify that period of two-thirds of a second to be muted.").
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the extent that the plaintiffs cannot expurgate a movie without
significant edits or distortions of the plot, they will not edit it. 127
The Defendants' moral rights claims are weakened somewhat,
too, by the fact the plaintiffs are simply doing for their customers
what the Defendants already do to prepare their movies for airlines
and television, venues on which nearly all popular movies eventually
find themselves. It is true that directors often have a hand in preparing
the edited versions for these venues, or at least consenting to them,
and that the Plaintiffs' versions are unauthorized. The very fact that a
director/studio has approved or consented to the existence of a movie
in edited form, though, undercuts the notion that a third party
providing the same sort of edits inherently distorts or mutilates the
director's intent.
Furthermore, with most of the edits performed, the companies
are only providing for the customer a version of the movie that they
could otherwise provide for themselves if they were adept enough
with the fast-forward and mute buttons on a remote control. 128 The
studios even facilitate this somewhat, and thus tacitly approve of the
use of the remote control, by including direct access scene selection
with their DVDs. 129 With that in mind, the defendants' consternation
that CleanFlicks would cut five minutes from the opening scene of
"Saving Private Ryan" seems less justified when the owner of the
original version of the movie on DVD could, seemingly with the
defendants' approval, just as easily skip the opening scene entirely, as
well as any subsequent scene, and enjoy the rest of the movie. 130
127. See The Edited Artist FAQ, supra note 87. Nor does the industry have an incentive to
edit such movies since the customer would probably have little interest in seeing a movie
missing key plot elements.
128. This analogy exempts MovieMask's software to the extent that it allows users to add
images and sound to their masks. It also does not contemplate Clean Flicks' apparent ability to
blur portions of a screen image, rather than skip the image entirely.
129. The inclusion of the scene selection feature was important enough to the studios that
they mentioned in their complaint the absence of such in the Digital Editor's version. Motion
Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, Huntsman 51, No. 02-M-1662 (D.
Colo. 2002).
130. For this reason, the subtractive Player Control Technology is even more benign than
Galoob 's Game Genie, which lets the user do things with his video game that he could not do
absent the technology. See 964 F.2d at 967. This line of reasoning is what probably underlies
ClearPlay attorney Andrew Bridges' comment: "If ClearPlay is illegal, so is the remote control."
See Benny Evangelista, The Digital Censor: Utah Firm Locked in Legal Battle Over Software
that Blocks Out Sex and Violence on DVDs, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 20, 2003, at El.
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Lastly, the Defendants' moral rights claims are not helped by the
fact that they often target their movies for specific MPAA ratings. 131
In fact, directors even admit that a movie's rating is a "marketing
tool" for a film. 132 Steven Spielberg noted openly:
In a way it's better to get a PG-13 than a PG for certain
movies .... Sometimes PG, unless it's for an animated movie, it
turns a lot of people off. They think it's going to be too below their
radar and they tend to want to say, 'Well, PG-13 might have a little
bit of hot sauce on it.' 13 3
Another director was even more explicit: "People will go out of
their way to put in one dirty word in [a movie] just to get the rating
that they need to give the picture some legitimacy."' 134 Of course this
is not true of all movies, since in many, the objectionable content
serves some artistic or aesthetic purpose. 135 Presumably, these are
often the same types of movies that the Plaintiffs will not edit. It is
true enough, though, that in light of the above quotes it seems
somewhat disingenuous for defendants' to summarily decry plaintiffs'
actions as mutilation of their artistic expression, when the third party
editors often do no more than remove the "hot sauce" that defendants
expected would give the movie broader appeal. The entire edited
movie industry simply establishes that some segments of the
population prefer, and often will only tolerate, their movies without
"hot sauce."
In any event, the Defendants' lack of statutory protection for
moral rights outside of Gilliam's tenuous Lanham Act ties make it
doubtful that they will be vindicated in the CleanFlicks' case.
B. Defendants' Derivative Works Claims
1. ClearPlay and the Player Control Parties
The studios' copyright claims against the Player Control Parties
hinge on their ability to convince the court that movies viewed
131. See, e.g. Mark Armstrong, Stiller's PG-13 Orgy, Er, 'Love Fest,' E-Online (Sept. 10,
2001) at www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,18803,00.html (chronicling Ben Stiller's success in
taming his film "Zoolander" to a PG-13, rather than an R, rating).
132. See Associated Press, PG-13 at 20: How 'Indiana' Remade Films, MSNBC News at
http://www.msnbc.com/id/5798549 (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Ironically, the two examples often cited where the objectionable content serves an
artistic or expressive purpose are Spielberg's "Schindler's List" and "Saving Private Ryan." Not
coincidentally, these are among two movies that ClearPlay does not edit.
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through filtering software on a computer or television screen amount
to derivative works under § 106(2). To that end they argue that a
derivative work does not require fixation in order to be infringing. 136
The studios seem to recognize, though, that relying on an unqualified
non-fixation requirement leads to untenable results. 137 It is probably
for this reason that they embrace the Ninth Circuit's limited fixation
requirement in Micro Star.
Proving that the Player Control Parties violated § 106(2) under
Micro Star requires showing that the edited movie the viewer
experiences using the filtering software "incorporate[s] a protected
work in some concrete or permanent form."'138 The studios assert, in a
clear analogy to the software in Micro Star, that a ClearPlay edited
movie is a combination of the software, the filter file, and the original
DVD. 139 The resultant audio-visual is therefore "permanently and
concretely embodied in the individual motion picture-specific Filter
Files."140
At first glance, the comparison to Micro Star's Nuke It looks
appealing. The filters instruct the DVD player just as the MAP files
instructed the Duke Nukem 3D game engine. 141 The comparison,
however, ignores the fact that the "concrete or permanent form"
requirement in Micro Star requires some "incorporat[ion] [of the
136. See Defendant Motion Picture Studios' Response Brief in Opposition to ClearPlay,
Inc.'s, Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s, and Family Shield Technologies, LLC's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5, Huntsman, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Defendant's
Response Brief]. Among other things, the studios point to the absence of a fixation requirement
in the language of § 106(2) and to the statute's legislative history stating that "a derivative
work ... may be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in a concrete or permanent
form." Id.
137. Aside from rendering punishable one's imagination of a derivative work as noted by
Ochoa, supra note 42, removing a fixation requirement from § 106(2) would also make illegal
any original use of the remote control to rewind, mute, skip, fast-forward, or even pause a
movie. It seems highly unlikely that a court would be willing to accept a definition of a
derivative work that criminalized original uses of the remote control. See Lee, 125 F.3d at 582
("A definition of derivative work that makes criminals out of art collectors and tourists is jarring
despite Lee's gracious offer not to commence civil litigation."). It is for this reason that Ochoa,
supra note 42, at 1020, argues that Congress' intent in noting that a derivative work need not be
fixated to be infringing was merely to prohibit public performance or display of a derivative
work. In other words, the right to prepare derivative works is infringed only in conjunction with
at least one of the other exclusive rights of § 106. Id.
138. MicroStar, 154 F.3dat llll.
139. See Defendant's Response Brief, supra note 136 at 7. In Micro Star the court noted
that "Duke Nukem 3D" consisted of three separate components: the game engine, source art
library, and MAP files. 154 F.3d at 1110.
140. See Defendant's Response Brief, supra note 136 at 6.
141. MicroStar, 154 F.3dat 110.
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underlying] protected work."' 142 The Player Control Parties' software
and filter files simply do not incorporate any of the underlying
copyrighted work. Instead a filter is made up only of the time code of
the DVD and instructions to mute or skip at certain moments. 143 It is
true that the mute and skip instructions in the filter were implemented
by an editor viewing the original movie, but then it seems unlikely
that a time code that happens to match the running length of a DVD
could even be said to embody some portion of the underlying
copyrighted movie. 144
Even if the court did stretch to construe the time code to be an
embodiment of the underlying movie, the timing sequence of a movie
can hardly be said to be an "exact, down to the last detail,
description" of a movie, as the MAP files in Micro Star were of the
Duke Nukem 3D. 145 In fact, the time code of a movie does not
describe or detail anything, except for the movie's run time. When the
mute and skip instructions are laid over the time code, the filters still
contain no detail or description of what it is they are muting or
skipping. In the end, the Player Control Parties' filtering software
simply does not permanently or concretely embody enough, if any, of
the underlying movies and cannot therefore create infringing
derivative works under § 106(2). This, in turn, means that neither the
Studios nor the Directors should have any successful claims against
the Player Control Parties.
2. CleanFlicks and the Digital Editors
The studios' § 106(2) claim against the Digital Editors is
stronger, if for no other reason than the fact that Digital Editors'
edited movies concretely and permanently embody most of a
copyrighted movie in a videocassette or DVD. The edited master
copy of a movie is also fixed on the companies' hard drive, so the
CleanFlicks methodology easily satisfies Micro Star's fixation
requirement.146
142. Id. at 1111 (quoting Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967).
143. See Player Control Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 91 at 12.
144. If the time code did embody some underlying portion of a copyrighted movie, then
ostensibly a director intent on matching the running length of his new movie with the running
length of his favorite movie Titanic would then embody a portion of copyrighted work and thus
be liable for infringement. The ridiculousness of the proposition should foreshadow the
unlikelihood of a court embracing the concept.
145. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 111.
146. The manner in which the Digital Editors concretely or permanently embody the
underlying movies also clearly seem to implicate § 106(l)'s exclusive right of reproduction
because the edits are not made to the original copy of the movie, but rather the movie is copied
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The remaining question, then, is whether the edited movies
"recast, transform[ ], or adapt[ ]" the underlying movie or otherwise
consist of "other modifications, which, as a whole represent an
original work of authorship."'147 This originality issue is perhaps
slightly more nuanced, but still heavily favors the movie studios.
To begin with, the digitally edited movies seem to fit well within
the Ninth Circuit's low threshold originality requirement in
Mirage.148 The Ninth Circuit there found that simply removing
pictures from a book and mounting them on ceramic tile "certainly
recast or transformed the individual images."' 149 While the Digital
Editors' movie editing practices are not entirely analogous to
mounting pictures with new backgrounds, the court's matter of fact
analysis that such a minimally transformative act was within the
statute's definition leaves little dispute that the Digital Editors'
altering of the actual content of the underlying work would also fit the
definition.
Judge Kozinski's "Pink Screener" example in Micro Star
provides further support that the Digital Editors meet the Ninth
Circuit's originality requirement. 150 The example was part of a
footnote to the opinion aimed at illustrating a derivative work's
fixation requirement, but also inadvertently showed how little
originality § 106(2) actually required. The court noted that putting a
piece of pink cellophane in front of a television would recast in pink
all the images perceived on that particular television. Under the
court's reasoning, as long as someone was recording the recast
images (thus meeting § 106(2)'s fixation requirement) the pinker
versions of the television programs would be derivative works.
Presumably, then, when the Digital Editors carefully edit movies by
deleting or muting those elements that meet their criteria for being
objectionable, they exercise significantly more originality and
creativity than one who merely places a piece of cellophane in front
of a television.
onto a hard drive, edited, and then copied again either onto the original video cassette,
subsequent original video cassettes, or DVD-RWs. While violation of the studios' exclusive
right to reproduce the movie is beyond the scope of this paper, because this paper argues that the
Digital Editors also prepare derivative works under § 106(2) both matters are ultimately
resolved by a fair use analysis, which is discussed below.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
148. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1343.
149. Id. at 1344.
150. MicroStar, 154F.3dat llln. 4.
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Their editing practices should likewise meet the slightly more
stringent requirement of the Seventh Circuit in Lee, which found the
actions described in Mirage to be "mechanical," and therefore neither
transformative of the underlying artwork nor original.151 The Digital
Editors might hang on the language of Lee and argue that they
likewise simply mechanically excise a predetermined list of words,
acts, and images. Such a general characterization, however, would
belie the deftness and care that likely go into making edits as
unnoticeable as possible, where objectionable words and images are
removed while still trying to preserve the flow of a scene or dialogue.
This too, entails affecting the content of the copyrighted work, as
opposed to simply changing the backdrop or frame of a piece of
artwork. The implication is that, in all likelihood, under either
circuit's interpretation, the Digital Editors' reworking of the
underlying movies amounts to preparation of a derivative work in
violation of § 106(2).
a. First Sale Defense
Anticipating the possibility of a § 106(2) violation, the Digital
Editors assert two affirmative defenses, the first of which is the first
sale defense. As noted above, § 109(a) entitles the owner of a lawfully
made copy of a work to, "without the authority of the copyright
owner... sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy."'1 52
The Digital Editors basically argue that because they (or the
consumers themselves) own legitimate copies of the underlying
movie, they can do whatever they please with that copy, including
edit it for content, so long as they are careful to retain a one to one
ratio between the number of original copies purchased and edited
copies produced.
The Digital Editors' argument here probably fails for two
reasons. First, courts thus far interpreting the first sale doctrine as an
affirmative defense to § 106(2) infringement have uniformly held that
the "mere sale" of a copy of an underlying work does not transfer
with it the right to prepare derivative works. 153 Second, § 109(a)
151. Lee, 125 F.3d 580 at 582.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2002).
153. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1344; see also Precious Moments v. La Infantil, Inc., 971 F.
Supp. 66 (D.P.R. 1997) (holding that the first sale doctrine limits only distribution rights of the
copyright owner and not other exclusive rights conferred by § 106, including the right to prepare
derivative works). It seems worth noting that within the literal language of the statute the case
can be made that § 109(a) does limit the rights of copyright holders to preparation of some types
of derivative works, namely subtractive derivative works, or those derivative works that merely
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applies only to a legitimately purchased copy of the work. When the
Digital Editors copy the movie onto a hard drive and then
subsequently copy the edited version over the original or onto a blank
DVD, they likely lose the protection of the first sale doctrine. This
should be the case even when they maintain a one to one ratio of
original versions to edited versions, and even when companies like
CleanFlicks subsequently disable the original copy. A court would
strain the meaning of § 109(a) by holding otherwise.
b. Fair Use
The Digital Editors alternatively claim that their editing practices
amount to "fair use" of the original movies under § 107. The section
provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
remove elements of an original work to create a new work. Support for this argument is within
the statute itself, which confers the ability to "sell or otherwise dispose of' a legitimately
purchased copy of the original. The idea is that, since the statute says that the owner of a copy is
entitled to dispose of or alienate his ownership in all of an original, he therefore is also
permitted to dispose of parts of the original if he chooses. Hence an owner, completely within §
109(a)'s protection, should be able to tear out pages or cross out words of his copy of the latest
Harry Potter novel in an original way and then resell the book as a derivative of the original
novel. This type of derivative work has not yet been considered by courts in light of the first sale
doctrine, but would presumably protect the old splicing method of editing videocassettes that
only disposes of images or audio on an otherwise lawful copy of a movie. This possible
protection does not apply to the Digital Editors' current practices though for the reason
articulated below.
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The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such is made upon consideration of all the above
factors. 154
Fair use determinations are "mixed question[s] of law and
fact" 155 and accordingly are "not to be simplified with bright-line
rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for a case-
by-case analysis."' 156 The following examines the Digital Editors'
claim in light of the factors set forth by the statute.
i. The Purpose and Character of the Use
Analysis of the purpose and character of the Digital Editors' use
of Defendants' movies looks first to whether the use is for
commercial or non-profit purposes. Finding that a use is commercial
weighs against, but does not preclude, a determination of fairness.157
Additionally, it looks to whether the new work simply substitutes for
the old work or alternatively transforms it by "add[ing] something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message."' 158  The "more
transformative the work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism."' 159
The Digital Editors' use of the Defendants' movies is clearly
commercial, since these businesses sell their edited versions of
Defendants' movies with the intent to profit from them. Whether their
edits are transformative of the underlying movies, however, is a little
more difficult to determine. In one respect, the edits made to the
movies often only minimally impact the characters and storyline. In
fact, as noted previously, the Digital Editors' incentives are to keep
the edited movie as close to the original movie as possible in terms of
plot, theme, and characters, removing only what is necessary to make
it more palatable to sensitive viewers. This essentially means that the
Digital Editors' goal is to edit the movies while leaving the new
versions as non-transformative as possible. This obviously works in
the Defendants' favor.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).
155. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
156. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). § 107's legislative
history reiterates this point: "Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no
generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on
its own facts." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976).
157. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 584.
158. Id. at 579.
159. Id.
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The possibility that the edited versions are still transformative,
however, is somewhat compelling. The argument is that the edited
versions must transform the expression of the original movies in some
meaningful way because otherwise there would be no separate market
for them. At present there is a healthy market for the edited films, 160 a
market that pays a premium of as much as double the price of the
original movie. 161 The very fact that consumers sometimes pay
double the price of the originals for edited DVDs seems to indicate
that sanitizing these movies does meaningfully alter their expression,
even if not by entirely transforming it.
Additionally, the edited movies purportedly do not supersede the
market for the original, but instead capture "a new audience beyond
the audience of the original work." 162 In other words, the edited
versions do not replace or supplant the original version because those
people in the market for the edited film would not have otherwise
been in the market for the original. This also tends to indicate that the
Digital Editors' use is transformative.
ii. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second statutory factor looks to the nature of the underlying
copyrighted work and how closely it comes to "the core of intended
copyright protection."' 163 In this regard, works that rise above mere
fact compilations and demonstrate some measure of creativity are
more deserving of protection, making fair use more difficult to
establish. 164
Movies are, of course, highly creative works, and as such "fall[]
within the core of the copyright's protective purposes."' 165 This factor
weighs against the Digital Editors' fair use claim.
160. Viewerfreedom.org reported the industry made under $10 million in revenue in 2003.
See ViewerChoice Lawsuit FAQ, http://viewerfreedom.org/legal/faq.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2005).
161. See CleanFilms, Movies For Sale, http://www.cleanfilms.com/specials.phtml
(charging as much as $28.95 for an edited movie and an original together) (last visited Oct. 4,
2005).
162. Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Huntsman, No. 02-M-1662 (D.
Colo. Oct. 31, 2002).
163. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.
164. Id. See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348-351
(1991) (contrasting factual compilations with creative works).
165. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.
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iii. Amount and Substantiality of Copyrighted Work Used
The third factor also clearly weighs against the Digital Editors'
fair use claim. It looks to "the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."'166 By their very
nature, the edited movies incorporate almost all of the underlying
originals. As mentioned previously, the intended purpose is to retain
as much of the original movie as possible, excising parts only as
necessary to meet the entertainment standards of the consumer. The
Supreme Court has noted that "the extent of permissible copying
varies with the purpose and character of the use," 167 and that even
copying a work in its entirety does not necessarily "militate against a
finding of fair use." 168 While the amount copied might not militate
against finding fair use, it certainly weighs against it here.
iv. Effect Upon Potential Market or Value of Copyrighted Work
Lastly, the fair use analysis considers a derivative work's
"effect... upon the potential market for or underlying value of the
copyrighted work. ' 169 This is "undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use." 170 The underlying principle behind this factor is
that "[flair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others
which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which
is copied."' 171 The standards for what specifically constitute "potential
market or underlying value," however, vary widely.172
The Digital Editors' chief argument in the fair use analysis is
that their businesses pose no harm to the markets of the original
movies. Instead, their edited movies actually expand the market base
for the original movies because their customers are required to
purchase (or have the businesses purchase) an original copy of each
166. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).
167. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
168. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).
170. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567.
171. Id. at 566-67.
172. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (holding that inquiry under this factor "must
take account not only of the harm of the original but also harm to the market for derivative
works"); Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 592 (holding that "[tihe market for potential derivative uses
includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to
develop); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting the
standard as contemplating only those markets that the plaintiff has already entered); Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1275 (11th Cir. 2001) (interprets the fourth
factor as examining whether the new work supplants demand for the original and its already
licensed derivatives).
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edited movie they order. Far from "materially impair the
marketability of [the Defendants' movies]," 173 the Digital Editors'
derivative works actually generate more revenue for the Defendants-
revenue that the movies otherwise would not have captured. This
alone would likely satisfy the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of
"potential market" in Suntrust Bank as well as the Ninth Circuit's
standard in Arriba Soft, both of which focus the inquiry solely on
harm, or lack thereof, to the markets that the copyright holder has
already entered. 174
The analysis of the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose, however, not
only evaluates the derivative work's harm on the current market for
the copyrighted work, but also those markets "that creators of original
works would in general develop or license others to develop." 175 It is
here that some commentators have been quick to conclude that the
Digital Editors obviously impair the Defendants' potential market for
edited versions of their own movies and thus cannot effectively claim
fair use. 176 Initially, this seems possible under Acuff-Rose because the
market for edited versions of the original movies certainly seems to
be the type of market one might reasonably expect the studios to
enter-especially given that they already license similar edited
versions of movies to airlines and network television.
The Digital Editors' businesses, though, still do not cause any
substantial harm to even these potential markets for the Studios. This
is true for several reasons. For one, the Studios themselves allege that
the copies produced by the Digital Editors are inferior in quality to the
originals. Not only are the audio and video "sometimes significantly
degraded" from the original videocassettes, but the DVD copies:
do not have most, if any, of the have enhanced features, such as
crystal clear digital images or sound, surround sound, navigation
menus, direct access scene selection, foreign languages, or special
extra features such as the directors' commentary or deleted scenes,
which consumers have come to expect on commercially-released
DVDs from the Studios. 177
173. Id.
174. See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1275; Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d at 821.
175. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 592. The Court here appears to narrow the broader standard of
Harper & Row that stated the fourth factor should simply look to the "harm to the market for
derivative works." 471 U.S. at 568.
176. See, e.g., NOKEs, supra note 75, at 648.
177. Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims 50-51, Huntsman,
No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2002).
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If the facts are as the studios allege, the only potential market the
Digital Editors have adversely affected is the market for poor quality
edited DVDs and videocassettes. The market for edited versions of
the high quality DVDs that the Studios are known for, with all of the
features "consumers have come to expect," remains entirely
unaffected and within the Studios' control, according to their own
version of the facts.178
A second factor worth considering is that in addition to being
able to produce higher quality edited versions of the original movies,
the studios could also easily undercut the Digital Editors' market as
soon as they decide to enter it. The reason for this is that the Digital
Editors are encumbered by having to incorporate the retail cost of an
original copy of the movie into their pricing scheme. 179 This comes in
addition to charging for the edited version. The studios, by contrast,
can easily at any time enter that same market, charge only half what
the Digital Editors must charge, and still make profits similar to what
they make on sales of their original DVDs and videocassettes. This
essentially means that as soon as the Studios decide to enter the edited
movie market, they can almost immediately price the Digital Editors
out of business. Thus the Digital Editors' are not likely to cause any
substantial harm to any potential markets for the Studios.
Ultimately this fourth "most important element" of fair use
should favor the Digital Editors, regardless of which of the several
interpretations the court chooses to adopt.
v. Additional Fair Use Considerations
One additional factor sometimes considered by courts in a fair
use analysis is public policy or the perceived social utility of a
derivative work. 180 It is worth mentioning that, on balance, having
edited versions of popular movies available for the public would
likely be considered socially desirable as a means of limiting the
objectionable material children are exposed to. 181 The court would
178. Id.
179. Alternatively, they have to make sure that customers have already imposed that cost
on themselves by previously purchasing an original copy.
180. See National Rifle Ass'n. of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed., 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir.
1994) (noting that "The scope of Fair Use is wider when the use relates to issues of public
concern.") (citing Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
181. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Lamar Smith: 21" District of Texas, Smith's
Bill to Protect Children to Become Law (Apr. 19, 2005), available at
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likely be hard-pressed to ignore this element, even if not expressly
part of the analysis.
c. Weighing the Fair Use Factors
Considering all of the factors together, the Digital Editors may
have a successful fair use claim. Professor Paul Weiler gave what
may be the bottom line in deciding the issue:
There is a qualitative difference between someone making a whole
host of free copies from the original, and someone making changes
in a whole host of originals they've bought. [CleanFlicks] bought
these copies, and if consumers want to use their computers to edit
out something, clearly they have a right to do that.182
Given the above analysis, Professor Weiler's conclusion is, of
course, anything but certain. The factors play out in such a way that
the court could plausibly take either side's position and argue it
sensibly, depending on just how heavily it weighs the fourth factor.
The character of the Digital Editors' use of the Defendants' movies is
obviously commercial, though the court could find either way on
whether or not the new works are transformative. Movies are also
highly creative works, and the Digital Editors substantially
incorporate them in their edited versions. Both of these factors weigh
heavily against fair use. However, the heaviest factor, -the effect of
the use on the actual and potential markets-is where the Digital
Editors have the strongest claim. Their edited movies are at best
minimally intrusive on the studios potential market for edited films
and actually serve to expand both the current market and revenue for
Defendants' movies. Public policy may also play a role finding fair
use, since facilitating parents' abilities to further screen children from
objectionable content in movies seems generally desirable.
3. Enter the Family Movie Act
Recent legislative activity indicates that Congress also wants a
hand in the litigation's outcome. In February of this year, the Senate
passed the Family Movie Act of 2005,183 which exempts the use of
http://lamarsmith.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&lD=616 (quoting Rep. Lamar Smith,
R-TX, as saying that "I feel strongly that parents should decide for themselves what their
children see and hear on television."). Also, not surprisingly, these same proponents often fail to
mention that families might simply choose not to watch an objectionable movie at all.
182. Peter Rojas, The Blessed Version, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 9-15, 2002, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0241/rojas.php.
183. See Jerry Spangler, House to OK Film Filter, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Apr. 19,
2005, available at http://www.deseretnews.comi/dn/print/1, 1442,600127632,00.html.
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ClearPlay and other subtractive filtering technology from copyright
and trademark liability.184 President Bush signed the bill in late April
of 2005.185
With the bill now signed, The Family Movie Act has already
heavily influenced the current CleanFlicks litigation by effectively
ending the lawsuit against the Player Control Parties. 186 Less certain
is how the legislation will subsequently impact the Defendants'
remaining claims against the Digital Editors. A few scenarios seem
possible: (1) it may compel the Defendants to settle their remaining
claims against the Digital Editors, perhaps by granting some licensing
agreement; (2) if agreement remains out of the question, the studios
may alternatively initiate release of their own edited DVDs and
videocassettes, which would easily push both the Digital Editors' and
Player Control Parties' out of the market; (3) the court may look to
the Player Control Parties' legislative exemption, reason that both
technologies offer "functionally equivalent" edited versions, and
allow such to tip the scales in finding fair use for the Digital Editors;
or (4) the court may look to Congress' failure to exempt the Digital
Editors and see it as a reason to find against fair use.
This last scenario seems especially plausible, since the drafters
of the bill obviously had the CleanFlicks litigation in mind while
crafting the exemption. 187 The fact that Congress only chose to
protect one form of the technology, therefore, may be viewed as a
condemnation of digital editing as much as a Congressional blessing
184. The text of the bill makes legal: "the making imperceptible, by or at the direction of a
member of a private household, of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion
picture, during a performance in or transmitted to that household for private home viewing, from
an authorized copy of the motion picture, or the creation or provision of a computer program or
other technology that enables such making imperceptible and that is designed and marketed to
be used, at the direction of a member of a private household, for such making imperceptible, if
no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer program
or other technology." Family Movie Act of 2005, S.167, 109th Cong. (2005).
185. Vince Horiuchi, Law Puts ClearPlay in Clear; Family Movie Act Protects S.L. Firm,
Not Those That Physically Alter Movies, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Apr. 28, 2005, at C7.
186. J.G. Askar, Studios Needn't Pay ClearPlay Reparations, DESERET MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 20, 2005, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,600157215,00.html; See
Family Movie Act of 2005, S.167, 109th Cong. (2005) (The bill makes clear, however, that it
offers no protection for the additive elements of Trilogy's MovieMask software).
187. Orrin Hatch even noted that the bill "will help to end aggressive litigation threatening
the viability of small companies like ClearPlay which are busy creating innovative technologies
for consumers that allow them to tailor their home viewing experience to their own individual or
family preferences." See Jesse J. Holland, Bill to Let Companies Sanitize Hollywood Movies
Moving Fast in Congress, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Feb. 2, 2005) available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20050202-1430-cuttingmoviescenes.html.
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on filtering technology. 188 This seems further evident by the fact that
Congress rushed to the aid of that part of the edited movie industry
which was in least need of its help. Where the industry was in the
most need of protection, and where Congress could have been the
most help, its stoic watch from the sidelines speaks volumes. The
court is not likely to ignore this in determining fair use.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, even without the Family Movie Act, the likely
failure of the Defendants' moral rights based Lanham Act claims
portends at least a temporary halt to the "creep" of moral rights into
American copyright law. The Defendants' Gilliam-like claims simply
cannot survive absent the misrepresentation or inadequate labeling
required by the Gilliam court. This means that the Studios and
Directors will be unable to vindicate their moral rights in movies
unless and until Congress expressly protects those rights by statute,
something that Congress has thus far been unwilling to do. Until such
time, the Defendants must be content with the limited moral rights
protections indirectly afforded under both § 106 and a narrow
interpretation of the first sale defense.
The resolution of the Studios' copyright claims against both the
Player Control Parties and Digital Editors should further define the
boundaries of a copyright holder's exclusive right to prepare
derivative works. At one end, the court will likely reject the first sale
doctrine as a defense for infringing a copyright holder's right to
prepare derivative works. At the other, the court, in granting the
Player Control Parties' summary judgment motion, will likely define
a limitation of that right by requiring some form of fixation in an
infringing derivative work. Additionally, the court's determination
that the Digital Editors' methods satisfy the statute's originality
requirement may work to fill the void created by the Ninth Circuit's
near silence on this requirement. Lastly, the court's decision
regarding the Digital Editors' fair use of the Defendants' movies will
either expand or restrict § 106(2)'s protections, depending on how the
court ultimately answers the question. That ultimate answer, assuming
188. Soon after that passage of the Family Movie Act in the House, Senator Orrin Hatch
spoke to the Digital Editors advising them to "be careful" because "Copyright is very important,
and we cannot just run over it." Jerry Spangler, Hatch Gives Film Filterers a Warning, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 20, 2005 at B2, available at
http://www.deseretnews.com/dn/print/1,1442,600127632,00.html (The quote certainly seems to
show that the exclusion of the Digital Editors from the bill's protection was not a mere
oversight.).
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the court weighs heavily the Digital Editors' minimal intrusion on the
current and potential market of Defendants' movies, should tip the
balance in favor of fair use, though only by the slightest of margins.
The passage of the Family Movie Act, however, may lead the court
against a finding of fair use and, ironically, grant Defendants' a
victory they otherwise might not have been entitled to. This result
would then expand § 106(2) protections, ironically because of a bill
that expressly attempts to limit them. Either way the Studios and
Directors retain ultimate control over whether the third party edited
movie industry survives and for how long. What they are no longer in
control of is whether expurgated versions of their movies can exist at
all.
